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COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
The origins of most social science theories can be traced to the
unitary doctrines of the nineteenth century. Historically the analysis
of consumer behavior developed around classical models of economic
man. Whereas the roots of many analyses of social phenomena such as
crowd or group behavior lie in doctrines focusing on the basic irration-
ality of man, the obvious relevance of consumption to economics led to
a traditional emphasis on the logical aspects of consumer behavior
within the framework of microeconomic theory. More recently, many
researchers interested in consumer behavior have adopted a more behavioral,
less rationalistic orientation. Such a view portrays the consumer from
a psychological perspective—as a complex but limited and fallible
processer of information operating in a complicated communication
environment
.
In developing such psychological models, a family of concepts
called cognitive consistency theories may prove very powerful. These
theories postulate, not logical, but psycho-logical operations. In this
sense they may provide a valuable supplement to the more rationalistic
treatments of consumer behavior. While consistency theories have received
some attention with regard to consumer processes, their potential has not
been generally recognized. This discussion briefly reviews three of the
major consistency approaches and notes some of the more promising relevant
research evidence from the social psychology, communication, and marketing
literatures. The goal is to establish the relevance of cognitive con-
sistency to consumer behavior and to point out some directions for further
research.
Cognitive consistency is perhaps most relevant to consumer behavior
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in terms of attitude theory. The basic notion behind all of the con-
sistency concepts is that people are motivated to maintain a state of
psychological harmony within the system of beliefs which make up their
attitude about a given issue or situation. The various approaches to
cognitive consistency differ mostly in the manner in which they attempt
to characterize the psychological processes involved in attaining this
equilibrium.
BALANCE THEORY
One line of research dealing with cognitive consistency is closely
associated with the pioneering work of Fritz Heider. Heider (1946,
1958) was concerned mainly with our perception of the social world.
Various perceptual constancies received considerable attention from
the early Gestalt psychologists. For instance, most people see the
lines below not as a series of eight vertical lines but as a set of
four pairs of vertical lines
t
It seems that we are biased toward c 'eating such perceptual unity or
harmony. Heider "s contribution was to extend this thinking to the way
people perceive social events.
The social events of principal interest to Heider consisted of
three elements in a given person's experience, the person himself
(symbolized P), some other person (symbolized 0), and some event, idea,
or object (symbolized X). Two tyues of beliefs relating these cognitive
elements in the P-O-X system were postulated. Each type may be positive
or negative. Sentiment relations refer to beliefs that two elements
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are connected by liking (+) or disliking (-), favorable feelings (+)
or unfavorable (-) feelings, or some other evaluative relation. Unit
relations refer to beliefs that two elements belong together (+) or do
not belong together (-) in some sense, e.g., P buys X or owns X,
It was Heider's purpose to explore any systematic tendencies people
possess in cognitively organizing a P-O-X system. He proposed that people
attempt to maintain a psychological state called balance in which there
is no strain or stress in a system. A system is balanced if all three
of the signs of the relations between P, 0, and X are positive or if
any two signs are negative and one is positive. If only one sign is
negative and the other two are positive or if all three are negative,
a system is iabalanced. Thus, the system P buys X, P admires 0, and
buys X is balanced whereas P buys X, P admires 0, but never buys X
is imbalanced. Heider postulated that people attempt to restore balance
in an imbalanced system by changing the signs of the relations. In
the imbalanced system just mentioned, balance could be obtained by
changing the perceived relation between P and X so that P never buys X,
P admires 0, and never buys X.
Heider's formulation of balance theory has proven valuable in stimu-
lating research. Cartwright and Harary (195S) formalized the theory
using mathematical graph theory and extended it to relations between
N elements. This work gives a general principle for determining balance:
Balance exists if the product of all the signs is positive, imbalance if
the product is negative.
Empirical support for the notion of balance has been obtained
from two types of studies. The first simply presents a subject with
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hypothetical relationships and asks him to rate the pleasantness of each
one. It is predicted that balanced relationships will be more pleasant.
Jordan (1953) gave subjects 64 hypothetical P-O-X situations, half of
which were balanced and half unbalanced. In general, balanced rela-
tionships were in fact judged more pleasant than imbalanced ones. However,
this result was qualified by several complicating factors, among them the
tendency of subjects to always rate a situation containing a negative P-0
sentiment relation as unpleasant even if the relationship were balanced.
Price, Harburg, and Newcomb (1966) asked subjects to imagine several
relationships in which either positive or negative sentiment relations
existed between actual people whom they likedor disliked (e.g., You like
0, You dislike Q, imagine dislikes Q). Again balanced relationships
were rated more pleasant, but only if there was not a negative sentiment
relation between P and 0. As in Jordan's study, balance was not sufficient
to produce pleasantness in the face of a negative P-0 sentiment relation.
Rodrigues (1967), in a replication of Jordan's study, points to two
factors in addition to balance which affect pleasantness ratings, a
positivity effect as noted above such that greater pleasantness results
from a positive as opposed to a negative P-0 relation and an agreement
effect such that greater pleasantness results from situations in which
P and agree about X. Although Stroebe, Thompson, insko, and Reisman
(1970) argue that balance theory can itself account for positivity and
agreement effects, it seems clear that Haider's original formulation
does not completely explain these results.
The second type of study conducted to test balance theory gives
the subject a set of situations and then asks him questions about the
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relations or requires him to reproduce them. Bumstein (1967) administered
a questionnaire to students immediately before the 1964 Presidential
election containing a series of situations involving hypothetical relations
among two people and their feelings about a candidate. Students were
then asked which situations were likely to change and how. The results
indicated that initiallv balanced situations were seen as less likely
to change. As to what changes would occur, increases in positive rela-
tions in excess of the number needed for balance were predicted by the
subjects. These predictions also favored changes in interpersonal
relations as opposed to feelings about a candidate. Subjects evidently
expect balance, positivity, and a preference for interpersonal changes.
Zajonc and Burnstein (1965) tested the ability of subjects to learn
balanced versus imbalanced situations. If imbalanced relationships are
stressful, they should be harder to learn. The relations involved two
people and their feelings about either integration (important issue)
or Newsweek (unimportant issue). For instance, Dick approves of Newsweek
,
Don approves of Newsweek , and Dick dislikes Don or Tom approves of
integration, Ted disapproves of integration, and Tom likes Ted, Subjects
were presented each relation one at a time and had to remember whether
it was positive or negative, Zajonc and Burnstein found that unbalanced
situations were more difficult to learn but only when the issue was
important (integration). In addition, negative relations were more
difficult to learn, another positivity finding. Other studies (e.g.,
Gerard and Fleischer, 1967) indicate the effects of balance may be more
complicated still. It seems that perhaps balanced situations may be
remembered more easily with long-term memory and imbalanced situations
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with short-term memory, or even that some situations are intrinsically
more interesting and easier to remember because of their imbalance.
Taken together these studies demonstrate that balance does seem
to be an important force in social perception, though the principle is
not in itself a theory of social perception. The relevance of the basic
notion of balance for consumer behavior lies in focusing attention on
how the particular sentiment or unit relation linking the consumer and the
product fits in with his entire system of beliefs arising in connection
with the product. The emphasis of the theory on interpersonal relations
might also be fruitful in exploring the effects of social context on
product evaluations.
For work in consumer behavior, however, it may be desirable to have
a more explicit formulation of balance possessing a greater predictive
power. Fortunately Heider's work has directly stimulated research along
these lines. Rosenberg (1955 , 1960a, 1960b) defines attitudes as pro
or con feelings toward objects of affective significance. Attitudes
possess a structure composed of an effective component and a cognitive
(belief) component. According to Rosenberg there exists a homeostatic
tendency to maintain consistency between these components. Because of
this tendency, a mathematical index can be calculated for predicting
attitudes. Two variables are involved, the importance of the attitude
object in leading to or blocking valued states (instrumental relations or
beliefs) and the affect felt toward a given value. Figure 1 shows a
hypothetical attitude structure concerning "non-phosphate detergents."
Insert Figure 1 about here.
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To compute Rosenberg's index, it is necessary to obtain ratings of the
affect associated with each value and the strength of the instrumental
relation linking the value and the attitude object. Each value rating
is then multiplied by its instrumentality and these products are summed
to form the index of attitude. In our example (see Figure 1), the person's
overall attitude, based on the hypothetical ratings given in parentheses,
is predicted to be -4,
The affective-cognitive consistency side of this approach was later
elaborated more extensively by Rosenberg and Abelson (Abelson, 1959;
Abelson and Rosenberg, 1958; Rosenberg and Abelson, 1960). The later
version of the theory deals with cognitive elements, the objects of human
thought, and the cognitive relations between these elements. Both
cognitive elements and relations can be either positive, negative, or
null (neutral). No distinction is made between affective or instrumental
relations, both are allowed. The conceptual arena refers to the set of
all cognitive elements which are relevant to a given attitude object.
It may be thought of as a network of cognitive bands , where a band is
two cognitive elements connected by a relation. Figure 1 may be inter-
preted in these terms since each instrumental relation forms a band with
an element and the attitude object. Conceptual arenas have the property
of being balanced or imbalanced. Balance is achieved when all of the
cognitive bands involve either elements of the same sign linked with
a positive relation or elements of unlike sign linked with a negative
relation. Notice that balance is defined in terms of signs, without
reference to any numerical values. As before, balance is associated with
a positive product and imbalance a negative product. Note that our

example in Figure 1 is imbalance*!. Abelson and Rosenberg further
posit explicit "psycho-logical" rules which govern how a person thinks
about elements in his conceptual rtrena. Cne rule states, for instance,
that if A is positively related to B and B is negatively related to C,
then A is negatively related tc C, A conceptual arena is balanced if
no application of these rules leads to the discovery of a negative cog-
nitive band. However, Runkei. and Peizer (1968), employing Lambert's
(1966) set theoretic version of the rules of this psycho-logic, have
shown that there is no need to distinguish any distinct psycho-logic
from an ordinary two-valued logic. The theory must be extended to
multidimensional response spaces to handle this criticism.
A unique feature of Rosenberg and Abelson' s theory is that imbalance
is predicted to create a pressure toward change only if the individual
thinks about the imbalance. Imbalance may be resolved in one of three
general ways. A person may change the sign of one or more cognitive
elements, change the sign of one or more cognitive relations, or stop
thinking about the imbalance. Abelson (1959) specifies four means by
which changing the sign of an element or relation may be accomplished:
denial, bolstering, transcendence, and differentiation. The affective
sign may be simply denied or changed to its opposite. The imbalance
in the structure shown in Figure 1 may be resolved by denying that non-
phosphate detergent really leads to less pollution. An element in an
imbalanced cognitive band may be bolstered by relating it to other
elements in a balanced way. If curbing pollution is linked to political
fads, increased government spending, etc., imbalance should decrease.
Imbalance may be transcended by placing both elements in some super-
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ordinate classification. Curbing pollution (+) and non-phosphate deter-
gent (-) may be combined into the ledger element "popular gimmick" (-)
or "social responsibility" ( + ), of which only the former would resolve
the imbalance in our example. Finally, a very common method of imbalance
reduction is to differentiate an element into two different elements
which are balanced. Thus our hypothetical person may decide that only
air pollution needs curbing (+) while water pollution does not (-) and
that non-phosphate detergent (-) leads to (+) the latter, a -,+ ,- band, bu
not the former, a -,-,+ band.
Attitude change to accomplish imbalance reduction follows one of two
sequences: affective change followed by cognitive change or cognitive
change followed by affective change. Using posthypnotic suggestions,
Rosenberg (1960a) instructed subjects to feel differently about an
attitude object. He found that this affective change also produced change;
in cognitive instrumental linkages. If, for example, a subject's feeling
about blacks living in white neighborhoods was changed, the relations
between integrating blacks and vario s values changed too. Carlson
(1956) demonstrated the reverse sequence by convincing students that
allowing blacks to move into white neighborhoods leads to values such as
equal opportunity, and showing that this cognitive change led to affective
change regarding integration.
Another contribution of the Rosenberg and Abelson theory is to
hypothesize that imbalance reduction follows the easiest possible path.
That is , balance tends to be restored with the fewest number of operations
Support for this contention was gained (Rosenberg and Abelson, 1960)
by having subjects play the role of a department store manager where
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the role was defined by various cognitive elements and relations, e.g., high
sales is a positive cognitive element. The total structure represented by
these bands was imbalanced in differenl ways for different subjects. When subjects
were asked to evaluate three research reports which had the effect of
restoring balance, the}- favored the report which resolved their particular
imbalance in the fewest number of changes. However, these particular
experiments also revealed the operation of ether factors, a positivity
effect and a tendency toward maximising gain and minimizing loss (subjects
did not reduce imbalance in a way that would reduce sales). This latter
factor led Rosenberg and Abelson (1960) to postulate a "dual force
conception" which is extremely important for consumer behavior. Balance
represents one force on a cognitive band and hedonic satisfaction another.
In some cognitive bands these forces may conflict. Rosenberg (1965)
provides a valuable discussion of this problem. He argues that imbalance
will be less likely to result in change for a hedonic cognitive band than
an antihedonic one. For example, the imbalance in "My mother-in-law (-)
supports (+) my plan to buy a new car (+)" is less stressful than in
"The distinguished firm of Schlag and 7ons (+) have put on the market (+)
a completely worthless sphygmomanometer (Rosenberg, 1965, p. 133)."
Rosenberg (1965) also presents experimental data supporting the prediction
that hedonic imbalance is less stressful than antihedonic imbalance.
It may be possible, however, to account for this hedonic force within
balance theory by employing the self as a separate cognitive element.
When the self (+) is associated with (+) a motive-frustrating state of
affairs (-), imbalance is greater than when it is associated with a
rewarding state (+), because another imbalanced band has been added to
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the structure in the former case (Rosenberg and Abelson, 1960, p. 146).
The above example then becomes "My mother-in-law (-) supports (+) my
plan to buy a new car (+)" and "I (-?-) am associated (+) with this
benefit (+)," an imbalances and a balanced band. The worthless
sphygmonanometer band, however, is coupled with an unbeneficial self-
association, which creates two imbalances instead of one. It is perhaps
worth noting that these authors attribute much of the interest in
dissonance theory to the fact that it usually analyses these doubly
stressful antihedonic imbalances involving the self. This entire
problem is worth considerable attention from consumer behavior researchers,
for many of the important imbalances in this area are of the conflicting
hedonic variety. Is "Non-phosphate detergent (-) leads to (+) curbing
pollution (+)" really imbalanced?
As already discussed, the earlier work on Rosenberg and Abelson's
theory postulated a mathematical model for predicting attitudes. This
model has attracted some attention from consumer behavior researchers.
Sheth and Talarzyk (1972) compared mee ures derived from this model
with brand preference and found only a very weak association. Such
studies, however, have been oriented more toward an expectancy x value
framework for attitude research (see Cohen, Ahtola, and Fishbein, in
press). Full application of the Rosenberg and Abelson work within a
balance theory framework awaits further research.
To suggest the potential of this research, a study by Insko, Blake,
Cialdini, and Mulaik (1970) provides a good example. A survey was
administered in which cognitive elements and statements relating these
elements to some asnects of birth control were rated, the former on a
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good-bad scale, the latter on a true-false scale. Respondents were women
in a public housing project. Thy oats -ras analyzed by meanF of factor
analyses to determine differences between users and non-users of con-
traceptives. Cognitive consistency seemed to be greater for users
than non-userr. . The data indicated severaj. requirements for both control
campaigns including educating the husband as well as the wifa and creating
cognitive links between birth control and family goals.
While attitudes are certainly a crucial aspect of consumer behavior,
the nature of the relationship between attitudes and behavior is an open
question (see Caloer and Ross, in press; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1972).
Thus, before leaving balance theory, we should describe an extension of
Rosenberg and Abelson'3 theory explicitly incorporating behavior as a
variable. Insko and Schopler (1957) present a model treating behavior,
an actual goal directed activity, as well as cognitive elements and
relations. All three are classified as either positive or negative.
Insko and Schopler contend that people try to maintain not only affective-
cognitive consistency but triadic consistency too. Consider a person who
enjoys smoking (affect'' and who smokes two oacks of cigarettes a day
(behavior). Now suppose he believes (cognition) that he should not be
smoking for reasons of health. This triad is composed of a positively
evaluated cognitive element, a negative cognitive relation, and a
positive behavior. The product of the signs is negative, indicating
triadic imbalance. Insko and Schopler predict some change in the triad
to restore balance. It follows from this theory that behavior change
can produce attitude change as well as that attitude change can cause
behavior change. As we shall see, it is important in consumer behavior
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research for a model to allow for both sequences.
CONGRUITY THEORY
The congruity .node] of cognitive consistency developed independently
of balance; theory, though it is certainly similar in spirit. Whereas
Heider had been interested in social perception, congruity theory stemmed
from Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum ! b (1957) work on the semantic dif-
ferential as a measure of meaning. One result of this research was to
find a general evaluative dimension of meaning which could be equated
with attitude. From itr incaption, the model was oriented toward the
changes in attitude produced by source effects (Tannenbaum, 1968, p. 5U).
Source effects involve a situation where a person has an attitude about
a communication source and about an issue. The source then makes an
assertion about the issue. How does this assertion affect both the
attitude toward the source and the attitude toward the issue?
The theory (Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955; Osgood, 1960; Tannenbaum,
1967) is stated in terms of corrmiunication sources and objects of judgment
which are connected by either an associative assertion (e.g., likes,
buys, praises) or a dissociative assertion (e.g., dislikes, refuses to
buy, criticizes). While assertions have only two values, associative
or dissociative, sources £jid objects can take on values ranging from
+3 to -3 according to their semantic differential ratings. An example
of the type of attitude structure we have in mind is diagramed in Figure 2
in a manner introduced by Brown (1962). In this example (see Figure 2a)
Insert Figure 2 about here.
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the source is the magazine Consumer Reports , which has been previously
evaluated positively (+2) by our respondent, and the object of judgment
is a certain automobile make previously evaluated as slightly negative
(-1). Consumer Reports publishes a story recommending that people buy
this automobile, an associative assertion.
According to the theory, a state of congruity exists whenever a
source and an object with the same numerical evaluation are associated
and whenever a source and an object with opposite evaluations (e.g., +2
and -2) are dissociated. The lack of congruity, or incongruity, creates
a pressure to change both the source and object attitudes to a congruent
state. This pressure, P, is postulated to be different for the source
and the object. It equals the amount each one would have to change alone
to bring about congruity. In our example (see Figure 2a), the pressure
on Consumer Reports is -3, a change of three units in the minus direction
would produce congruity. Similarly, the pressure on the automobile
attitude is +3. (If the assertion were dissociative, the pressures
would be -1 and -1 respectively.) When incongruity exists, both the
source (S) and object (0) undergo pressure to change. The theory assumes,
however, that the actual change depends on how extreme the attitude value
is, a more extreme attitude changes proportionately less. The following
equation gives the change for the attitude object:
AC = |sl P + i A,
° tol + \s\ °-
~
where AC is the attitude change of the object, S is the absolute numerical
value of the source attitude, is the absolute numerical value of the
object attitude, P is the pressure toward congruity on the object, and
i and A are constants. Similarly, attitude change for the object is given
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by:
AC = 10 1 P + i.
S
lol + |S| s
~
In short, attitudes change a certain proportion of the total distance
required to create congruity, this proportion being determined by the
relative extremity of the attitude. The two constants are corrections to
the equations: i corrects for incredulity, the tendency to disbelieve
a highly incongruent assertion (e.g., "The United States government has
advocated that people buy Soviet made automobiles"). The incredulity
constant takes the opposite sign as P, thereby reducing the amount of
change necessary. The assertion constant builds in the assumption that
the object of an assertion should change more than the source. It is
positive for an associative assertion and negative for a dissociative
assertion; it is determined empirically. Without bothering with the
correction constants, we may calculate that in our example (see Figure 2b),
attitude toward Consumer Reports should change -1 units and attitude
toward the automobile should change +2 units. These changes would achieve
congruity, a similarly evaluated source and object associated by an
assertion.
We should note that incongruity need not necessarily lead to attitude
change. Tannenbaum, Macaulay, and Norris (1966) have described several
alternatives to attitude change as a means of reducing incongruity. A
person can deny or distort the association between the source and object
(e.g., "a prestige figure was paid to endorse a product"). Alternatively
a person can bolster his attitude toward the concept by seeking new
information or he can alter his attitude toward the source alone and
maintain the same attitude toward the concept. Unlike balance theory,
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these alternatives have not been emphasized.
Although congruity theory focuses on source effects, it can clearly
be extended to the same situations ^s balance by treating more than one
object and relation at a time. In fact it appears that balance theory is
a subcase of congruity theory in that any situation which is imbalanced
is also incongruent, though the converse is not necessary. It should be
clear that even with its formalization congruity theory is probably
of more narrow interest than balance theory. Notice also that the
congruity approach calls for averaging the elements of a cognitive unit whereas
Rosenberg's index employs a summation.
Research on congruity theory has yielded mixed results. Osgood and Tannen-
baum (1955) found that the equations predicted the direction of attitude change
better than the amount of change. Even more troublesome is Kerrick's (1959)
finding that like sign attitudes when associated may change to become more
extreme than either were separately. Recent research on congruity has
tended to discard the mathematics of the theory, concentrating instead on
its general implications. Tannenbaum (1966) demonstrated that attitude
change toward an object does generalize to a source and to other objects
connected to the source as well. In a review of this work, Tannenbaum
(1968) explicitly recommends keeping the attitude change through communica-
tion aspect of the model separate from its status as a "general model of
cognitive interaction." In view of the obvious importance of the source
effect situation for consumer behavior, congruity theory could provide a
valuable supplement to balance theory in just this connection.
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DISSONANCE THEORY
The origins of dissonance theory probably lie in Gestalt psychology
via the field theory approach of Kur. Lewin which postulated that
changes in a person's life space could occur as a result of psychological
tension. Like balance and congruity, dissonance is stated in terms of
cognitive elements and relations (Festinger, 1957). Cognitive elements
are defined much more loosely though. They may include any knowledge
a person has about himself, his behavior, or his world. Cognitive
elements may be perceived as related in one of two ways. If the existence
of one element x does not follow from another element y (i.e., x implies
not-y), the relation is dissonant; otherwise it is consonant. The
cognition "I purchase non-phosphate detergent" is dissonant with the
cognition "Non-phosphate detergent does not get clothes clean"—the one
does not follow from the other.
Cognitive dissonance is supposed to create a noxious state of
psychological tension in the individual. A person is thus motivated to
reduce dissonance and to avoid events that would produce dissonance.
The intensity of this motivation increases with the relative number of
dissonant cognitions and their importance. Dissonance may be reduced
by adding new cognitive elements favoring consonance or changing existing
cognitions toward consonance. Ir. our example, dissonance may be reduced
by adding new cognitions such as "Non-phosphate detergents curb pollution"
and "Non-phosphate detergent makes clothes smell fresh." Alternatively,
the person may change his behavior ("I no longer purchase non-phosphate
detergent") or his belief about cleaning power ("Non-phosphate detergent
actually does get clothes clean").
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Dissonance theory has not remained static since its introduction.
A number of researchers have attempted to modify the theory, usually
by specifying the conditions under which dissonance will or will not
be aroused. Brehm and Cohen (1962) emphasized the role of commitment
and volition in producing dissonance. More reeently, Aronson (1968
,
1969), Bramel (1968), and Collins (1959) have argued that dissonance is
connected with violations of a person's self-concept. Aronson states
perhaps the most general form of this argument. He characterizes
dissonance as arising most clearly from a violation of strong ex-
pectancies. One of the strongest expectancies most people have is that
their self-concept will remain positive. "Thus, at the very heart of
dissonance theory, where it makes its clearest and neatest predictions,
we are not dealing with any two cognitions; rather, we are usually dealing
with the self-concept and predictions about some behavior. If dissonance
exists it is because the individual's behavior is inconsistent with his
self-concept (Aronson, 1969, p. 27)." Aronson goes on to cite as an
example a study by Erlich, Guttman, Schonbach , and Mills (1957) showing
that new car owners selectively expose themselves to ads for their car.
To have bought a lemon would certainly violate most people's self-concepts,
Recall now our earlier discussion of a similar point in connection
with Rosenberg and Abelson's theory: antihedonic imbalance was supposed
to be greater than hedonic imbalance. Clearly Aronson is identifying
dissonance with antihedonic imbalance. If one considers when either of
these cases is likely to arise, it would seem that hedonic imbalance is
more prevalent before a behavior is performed and antihedonic imbalance
afterward. One does not often intend to do antihedonic things beforehand,
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but may well be trapped by them later. You do not intend to buy a lemon
but you may well find yourself with cne. For this reason, it is not
surprising that dissonance theory has proven especially powerful in
analyzing the effects of having already performed a behavior. It is
here that the greatest opportunity for antihedonic violations of self-
expectancies exist.
In considering the relationship between attitudes and behavior,
there are two possible causal sequences, attitudes may affect behavior
or behavior may affect attitudes. It was argued in the above discussion
that dissonance theory is more relevant to the effects of behavior on
attitudes because of the greater likelihood in this case of antihedonic im-
balance*- Moreover, in many circumstances an individual cannot change, or
even easily distort, his behavior (e.g #> a person can't deny having smoked for
twenty years. For both of these reasons, research has concentrated on how dissonance
connected with having performed a behavior affects one's private attitudes.
In this vain Engel and Light have correctly commented on the signifi-
cance of dissonance theory for consur ir behavior: "do consumers ever
become so committed (for instance, to a brand, a product, or a store)
that they will become dissonant if their preference is challenged?
The authors are of the opinion that such commitment indeed does occur
for two different reasons: (1) loyalty to a product or a store can develop
because one alternative becomes ego-involved and is, in effect, an ex-
tension of the consumer's self-concept; and (2) consumers establish
buying routines or habits for the purpose of greater shopping efficiency.
Loyalty from this latter source can represent genuine commitment (1968,
p. 189)." In terms of the more recent versions of dissonance theory,
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we might add that loyalty through involvement of the self-concept should
be most likely to create the possibility of dissonance.
Although many consumer behaviors might be examined by dissonance
theory, perhaps the most salient is the purchase decision. In many
cases the act of purchase may be closely identified with consumption
itself. One line of dissonance research which is particularly relevant
to the effects of purchasing deals with free choice situations. Consider
a person wishing to buy a new car who cannot decide between a Pinto and
a Vega. Finally he makes a decision, buying, say, the Vega. Dissonance
theory predicts that, unless one considers himself a "schnook" (Aronson,
1969, p. 27), once the decision is made the person's evaluation of the
Pinto will decrease and the evaluation of the Vega will increase. This
revaluation occurs because the positive aspects of the rejected alter-
native (the Pinto) are now dissonant with the purchase behavior, as are
the negative aspects of the chosen alternative (the Vega). Several
studies have tested this prediction. 3rehm (1956) asked female subjects
to evaluate several products such a? small appliances. Subjects then
chose one of two similarly evaluated products as a gift and were asked
to evaluate all the products again. • results indicate that subjects
increased their evaluation of the chosen product and decreased their
evaluation of the rejected product, This revaluation does not seem
to be due to the mere possession of the product. Control subjects who
were simply given a nroducx did not change their evaluations. Later
studies have improved on the methodology of Brehm's study and have
generally supported this finding (e.g., Brock, 1963; Walster, 1964;
Deutsch, Krauss, and Rosenau, 1962).
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Cohen and Goldberg (1970) conducted an elaborate experimental test
of the dissonance account or post-decision product revaluation. They
distinguished between the decision and the actual consumption of a
product. As a gift one group of subjects was allowed to choose between
a national brand of coffee (prior information) and a larger container of
a test brand (no prior information). They ware then allowed to inspect
but not consume samples of the twc brands which, unknown to them, were
the same. The results indicated a marginally significant tendency for
subjects choosing the national brand to evaluate it more highly than a
second group of subjects who had not received either brand as a gift;
there was no such tendency for the test brand. As predicted by dissonance,
choosing the national brand led to an increased evaluation whereas merely
inspecting it did not. The authors tentatively conclude that prior
information may affect product revaluation.
Subjects next were allowed to taste the two brands. By mixing
an unpleasant additive in a cup of coffee, it was possible to have
about half the subjects' choices confirmed (their choice tasted better)
and the other subjects' choices disconfirmed. The brands were evaluated
again and subjects indicated which they would probably buy. The results
revealed that subjects positively revalued their choice if it were confirmed
and devalued their choice if it were disconfirmed. The dissonance effect
obtained for the first, non-consumption measure of revaluation approached
significance only for the measure of purchase intention. These findings
are valuable in that they demonstrate the interactive nature of dissonance
effects within a consumer behavior context. Without prior information
in the form of brand familiarity, subjects' decisions probably carried
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little commitment and thus should not have aroused dissonance leading
to the revaluation of the test brand. In any event, the weakness of
the dissonance effects , especially ^fter the powerful confirmation-
disconfirmation manipulation, should not be surprising, for as the authors
note the product choice was not ego-involving. Future research along
these lines would add considerably to our knowledge of how purchase
decisions affect behavior.
In addition to revaluation a purchase decision may lead to other
behaviors because of dissonance. Ehrlich et al. (1957), as noted earlier,
found that after the purchase of a new car consumers read more ads for
the chosen car than for other cars. This study also found, contrary to
dissonance theory, that readership of ads for rejected cars was slightly
greater than readership of ads for cars not considered in the purchasing
decision. The new owners should have found these rejected car ads
dissonance provoking. Mills (1965) showed, however, that ratings of
product desirability are highly correlated with interest in ads. He
argued therefore that the new car owners may have read the rejected car
ads because the rejected cars were still more desirable than the other
cars. Alternatively the owners may have been seeking faults in the
rejected cars. Although Oshikawa (1969) does not find either of these
explanations compelling, they do illustrate the myriad possible effects
of dissonance. Other investigators have explored reactions to possibly
dissonant new product information (e.g., Carter, Pyszka, and Guerrero,
1969; Straits, 1964). Freedman and Sears (1965), Mills (1S68), and
Donohew and Palmgreen (1971) provide recent reviews of how people tend
to seek consistent information.
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An excellent example of how intriguing a dissonance analysis of
the effects of purchase behavior can be is presented by Doob , Carlsmith
,
Freedman, Landauer, and Tom (1969). The "introductory low-price offer"
is a standard marketing technique. Conventional wisdom has it that the
low price will attract buyers who will continue to purchase the product
after the price is raised. Doob et al. advance a dissonance account
disputing this conclusion. The higher the price a consumer can be induced
to pay for a product, the greater will be his tendency to reduce any
possible dissonance by convincing himself of the value of the product.
By buying a product at an introductory low price, the consumer is less
likely to convince himself it is a good product. To test this hypothesis,
Doob et al. conducted several experiments with groups of stores matched
on sales and randomly assigned to one of two conditions. One group of
stores introduced a product such as mouthwash at a lower price for two
weeks and then switched to the regular price while the other group sold
the product at the regular price all along. During the first two weeks
sales at the lower priced stores were understandably higher. However,
after the price was raised, sales fell in these stores to an amount
below that of the stores which had the higher price all along. Although
other interpretations of the data are possible, these results still
support the dissonance prediction that the lower price purchase decisions
did not engender as much loyalty as the higher priced ones. Nor is this
to say the exposure gained by introductory offers would not raise sales
for some products. Even so, in this study a 50% increase in sales from
the lower price was insufficient to overcome later the loyalty produced
by the higher price.
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Research on dissonance theory is voluminous . Our comments have been
intended to point out the relevance of the theory to consumer behavior.
Although much of the research on dissonance is complex and frequently
conflicting, it should be remembered that the theory is intended to function
less as a formal model than as a heuristic and language for deriving
interesting empirical hypothesis. In fact, an entire style of research
has grown up around the theory. While to some "much of the research on
dissonance theory has studied behavior in artificial and often trivial
situations (Cohen and Goldberg, 1970, p. 316)," in fact much of this research
has been ingeneous in providing a context for behavior in which dissonance
theory predictions could be tested experimentally. The real problem has
been in tying down the theory. The very looseness which invites creative
derivations renders the theory all but impossible to disprove. As Calder,
Ross, and Insko (in press) put it, "At present cognitive dissonance theory
is neither very cognitive nor very theoretical." In the face of all its
ambiguities, however, dissonance theory remains a novel and creative
framework for explaining the effects of behavior.
CONCLUSION
All three of the approaches to cognitive consistency have a place in
current consumer behavior research. Balance theory is perhaps most
relevant for understanding cognitive structure and predicting behavior
where a more formal model is desired. Congruity theory is especially
suited for analyzing the effects of communication sources such as the
media on consumer product evaluations. Dissonance theory provides a rich
framework for predicting the effects of behavior on other consumer processes.
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Taken together, cognitive consistency theories add a valuable dimension
to consumer research.

FOOTNOTES
There is an alternative, methodological interpretation: Subjects
who chose the test brand nay not have cared about its evaluation (a
self selection problem).
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
Figure 1. A hypothetical attitude structure for a product.
Figure 2. Attitude change produced by an associative assertion.
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